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Abstract
Deep neural networks are widely used and exhibit
excellent performance in many areas. However, they
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that compro-
mise the network at the inference time by applying
elaborately designed perturbation to input data. Al-
though several defense methods have been proposed
to address specific attacks, other attack methods can
circumvent these defense mechanisms. Therefore,
we propose Purifying Variational Autoencoder (Pu-
VAE), a method to purify adversarial examples. The
proposed method eliminates an adversarial pertur-
bation by projecting an adversarial example on the
manifold of each class, and determines the closest
projection as a purified sample. We experimentally
illustrate the robustness of PuVAE against various
attack methods without any prior knowledge. In
our experiments, the proposed method exhibits per-
formances competitive with state-of-the-art defense
methods, and the inference time is approximately
130 times faster than that of Defense-GAN that is
the state-of-the art purifier model.
1 Introduction
Significant progress has characterized deep learning in several
areas including image recognition [He et al., 2016], disease
prediction [Hwang et al., 2017], and autonomous driving [Yoo
et al., 2017]. However, security issues of deep neural networks,
which are especially vulnerable to adversarial attacks, are
emerging. The goal of adversarial attacks is to fool deep neural
networks via applying elaborately designed perturbation to
input data. Adversarial attacks make it hazardous to apply
deep neural networks in real world applications. In the case
of autonomous driving [Akhtar and Mian, 2018], attacks can
cause an accident by making an object detector recognize
pedestrians as roads.
To address these attacks, several defense mechanisms have
been proposed. There are three categories of defense mecha-
nisms. The first mechanisms involve modifying the training
dataset such that the classifier is robust against the adversarial
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Figure 1: Overview of the defense mechanism using the purifier
model.
attack [Szegedy et al., 2013]. Second mechanisms block gradi-
ent calculation via changing the training procedure [Buckman
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017]. However, they are only effective
for the gradient based attack methods. The third mechanisms
involve removing the adversarial noise from the sample fed
into the classifier [Samangouei et al., 2018].
Our main focus is defense mechanisms to purify input data
that may have added adversarial perturbation; this can allow
the mechanisms to effectively address any attacks. These
methods mostly work by using a generative model to learn
the data distribution and project the adversarial example into
the learned data distribution p(x). We term the generative
models as purifiers, and MagNet [Meng and Chen, 2017] and
Defense-GAN [Samangouei et al., 2018] are recent work. In
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Figure 2: Overview of the PuVAE algorithm; The green region repre-
sents the training process, and the blue region denotes the inference
process of PuVAE. The dotted line is the gradient flow in training
process. The parameters of the source classifier are not updated.
Figure 1, we show an overview of the defense mechanism
using the purifier model.
Specifically, MagNet learns the original data using one
or more autoencoders termed as the reformer networks and
passes input data to the autoencoders that move input data
closer to the data manifold. The purified data are supplied
to the classifier. However, the method has a disadvantage
wherein it exhibits poor performance when compared with
Defense-GAN.
Defense-GAN uses the characteristics of generative adver-
sarial networks (GANs) to defend a target model against ad-
versarial attacks. It uses the fact that optimizing the objective
function of the GAN is equivalent to making the generator
distribution pg identical to the data distribution pdata. After
training the GAN using the original data, Defense-GAN it-
eratively finds generator input z through the gradients. This
reduces the reconstruction error between the generated data
G(z) and the input data x that may have added adversarial
noise. Subsequently, data generated with optimal z are sup-
plied to the classifier as input. The model relies on the un-
stable performance of GAN, and this occationally reproduces
adversarial noise by directly optimizing errors between the
adversarial example x+ δ and the generated sample G(z). In
addition, because of Defense-GAN’s iterative nature, it takes
a long time to yield the maximum defense performance. In
particular, real-time applications such as object detection must
operate in a short period of time, so a fast defense algorithm
needs to be developed.
In this paper, we aim to rapidly generate well-classified sam-
ples from adversarial examples. The purified samples are fed
into the target classifier so that they are classified without be-
ing affected by adversarial attacks. To solve the limitations of
MagNet and Defense-GAN, we propose Purifying Variational
AutoEncoder (PuVAE) that purifies adversarial examples us-
ing a Variational Autoencoder (VAE). The proposed model
uses variational inference to generate samples that provide
comparable or better defense performance than the state-of-
the-art model. In contrast to Defense-GAN, PuVAE generates
clean samples with one feed-forward step. Therefore, our
method is robust against adversarial attacks within a reason-
able time limit.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a VAE-based defense method, PuVAE, to ef-
fectively purify adversarial attacks. The proposed method
shows a remarkable performanc over other defense meth-
ods.
• The proposed method significantly reduces the time to
generate purified samples. Within a reasonable time limit,
PuVAE outperforms state-of-the-art defense methods.
• Experimental results demonstrate that our method func-
tions robustly against a variety of attack methods and
datasets.
2 Background
2.1 Variational Autoencoder (VAE)
A generative model is used to represent data distribution. Most
data are too complex to directly find the relation in themselves,
and thus relatively simple latent variables are typically used
to represent data distribution. Kingma [2013] introduced Vari-
ational AutoEncoder (VAE), which is a method that uses a
combination of neural networks and variational inference to
learn a decoder that generates data from normal distribution.
The objective function of VAE is represented as follows:
log(p(x)) = DKL(qϕ(z|x)||pθ(z|x)) + L(θ, ϕ, x) (1)
L(θ, ϕ, x) = −DKL(qϕ(z|x)||pθ(z))
+ Ez∼qϕ(z|x)[log(pθ(x|z))] (2)
where log(p(x)) denotes the marginal log likelihood of
the data, L(θ, ϕ, x) denotes the variational lower bound of
marginal likelihood, pθ(x|z) denotes the output distribution
of the decoder, qϕ(z|x) denotes the output distribution of the
encoder, and pθ(z) denotes a normal distribution. By maximiz-
ing the lower bound, marginal likelihood of data is maximized.
In VAE, latent space is assumed as a multivariate Gaussian
distribution.
Doersch [2016] indicated that conditional Variational Au-
toencoder (cVAE) is specifically used to learn a multimodal
distribution via class information. The basic idea of cVAE is
similar to that of VAE, which aims to learn the distribution of
data. However, the encoder and the decoder of cVAE take a
class label as an additional input.
In this study, we select a cVAE structure to learn class-
specific data distributions. We use the encoder as the mapping
function of adversarial examples to the latent space of legiti-
mate images and the decoder as the reconstructor of images
from the latent spaces. We confirm that the forwarding process
via the encoder-decoder model effectively purifies adversarial
noise from data.
2.2 Adversarial Examples
An adversarial example is a sample that is designed to be
misclassified by the target classifier by using intended noise
that is not perceivable by humans. Prior to a study by Good-
fellow [2015], attackers exploited the non-linearity of neural
networks. However, the authors claimed that the cause of vul-
nerability to adversarial examples is a linear characteristic of
neural networks and proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) that uses the gradient from the objective function of
neural networks.
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Figure 3: Inference of PuVAE with an MNIST image; A latent vector zyi is sampled from an adversarial sample x and a class condition yi.
Although FGSM is a fast algorithm to make adversarial at-
tacks, it is easy to defend the one step gradient based approach.
In order to overcome the problem, the iterative Fast Graident
Sign Method (iFGSM) was proposed by Kurakin [2016]. The
method optimizes adversarial noise in several steps with a
small perturbation of an image which allows a more accurate
attack.
RAND+FGSM [Tra, 2017] is a new attack method that adds
random Gaussian noise to an image, and computes FGSM with
the perturbed image. Against the FGSM-based methods, we
used targeted adversarial attacks because we assume that it
is more difficult to defend targeted attacks than untargeted
attacks [Xu et al., 2019]. In our experiment, we randomly
chose target labels among classes with the exception of the
true class.
The Carlini and Wagner (CW) attack suggested by Car-
lini [2017] is the most powerful attack method among existing
methods. By solving the optimization problem in a gradient
descent manner, adversarial perturbation is derived as follows:
minimize ||δ||p + c ∗ f(x+ δ) (3)
subject to x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (4)
where f(x) denotes an objective function of a classifier and
δ denotes perturbation added to image x. In this study, we
used p = 2 and created CW attack with open source software
CleverHans1 by Papernot [2018] to verify whether our method
can defend the attack.
3 Proposed Method
In this paper, we propose a VAE-based defense method that
is coined as PuVAE to purify adversarial noise from data.
We consider a dataset Xdata that consists of data instances
xdata ∈ Rd where d denotes the dimension of the data space.
Corresponding class labels (one-hot vectors) are denoted by
ydata ∈ Rc in a set of classes C where c is the number of
classes.
We then consider a target classifier Mt that is the model
an attacker wants to attack. We also assume a set Xadv that
1https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
consists of adversarial examples xadv ∈ Rd created from
the target classifier. We define a set X which contains clean
samples and adversarial examples. Instances x from the set
X are used at inference time. We explain the procedures of
training and generating purified samples using PuVAE. The
overview of the proposed method is described in Figure 2.
3.1 Training process of PuVAE
PuVAE is comprised of an encoder and a decoder network.
The encoder receives a data-label pair and outputs the mean µ
and the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian distribution on
the latent space corresponding to the input label:
µ,σ = Encoder(xdata,ydata) (5)
Using µ and σ obtained from the encoder, the latent vector z
on the latent space is sampled:
z = µ+ ϵ · σ (6)
ϵ ∼ N(0, σϵI) (7)
where ϵ denotes a random variable for the reparameterization
trick, and σϵ denotes a hyperparameter that is multiplied by
the standard deviation to control the extent to which the latent
vector is sampled. In the experiments, we used σϵ = 1 in the
training time to ensure that the posterior latent distribution
follows the normal distribution.
In classification tasks, Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) using pooling and strides are used to select useful
features and to widen receptive field. However, this selective
nature of CNNs is a disadvantage on generative models, since
the feature selection causes information loss. Therefore, we
use a dilated convolutional neural network as the encoder to
get the latent vector z. Dilated convolution inserts zeros in the
filter, so that the receptive field is enlarged and information
loss is effectively reduced.
the sampled z enters the decoder with the label and produces
an output instance xˆ with the same dimension d as the input:
xˆ = Decoder(z,ydata) (8)
At the training time, PuVAE is trained to maximize the
variational lower bound in a manner similar to cVAE. Loss
Table 1: Neural network architectures for PuVAE.
Encoder Decoder
Dilated Conv(32, 7×7, 2) FC(512)
ReLU ReLU
Dilated Conv(32, 7×7, 2) Deconv(32, 7×7, 2)
ReLU ReLU
Dilated Conv(32, 7×7, 2) Deconv(32, 7×7, 2)
ReLU ReLU
FC(1024) Deconv(32, 7×7, 2)
ReLU Sigmoid
FC(1024)
ReLU
FC(64)
Softplus (for σ only)
functions from the encoder and the decoder are:
LRC = xdata log xˆ+ (1− xdata) log(1− xˆ) (9)
LKL = µ2 + σ2 − log(σ2 − 1) (10)
where LRC denotes the reconstruction loss function to min-
imize the difference between the input instance and output
instance, and LKL denotes Kullback-Leibler divergence be-
tween the output distribution of the encoder and the normal
distribution. This process allows PuVAE to construct the map-
ping of legitimate data on the latent space
Additionally, we use the cross-entropy calculated from a
classifier as a loss function for PuVAE. The classifier, called
source classifier Ms, learns the decision boundaries on the
data space. Since neural networks performing the same task
learn similar functions [Goodfellow et al., 2015], we use a
fixed architecture for Ms. Then, trained Ms is used to ensure
that the output instance reflects the characteristic of the classes
in C. The cross-entropy loss from Ms is as follows:
ys =Ms(xˆ) (11)
LCE = ydata logys + (1− ydata) log(1− ys) (12)
Finally, PuVAE is trained using the stochastic gradient descent
(SGD):
∇(λRCLRC + λKLLKL + λCELCE) (13)
where λKL, λRC, λCE are coefficients for each loss functions.
3.2 Generating Purified Samples
At the inference time, PuVAE projects an input sample to the
data manifolds of all classes in C as follows:
xˆyi = PuVAE(x,yi) (14)
where yi denotes the i-th class label in C to guide the input to
the corresponding latent space, and xˆyi denotes a candidate for
the purified sample. The inference also follows the Equations
(5), (6), and (7) as in training, where σϵ is used to sample the
latent vector z. We performed a hyperparameter search on σϵ
among {0, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100} for the inference. Thus, the
optimal value of σϵ is 0.1.
Because PuVAE only learns the distribution of z from the
training data, the input data is mapped to the learned latent
spaces even if adversarial example comes in. the adversarial
noise is removed in the projection to the latent variable.
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Figure 4: Comparison of coefficients for training PuVAE; an ad-
versarial example is highlighted with the yellow box The blue box
represents the output samples when the input x enters. Each row
shows output images from the model trained in different coefficient
combinations. Each column shows images sequentially conditioned
on class labels 0 ∼ 9. acc denotes the defense performance from Mt
using the coefficient combination of each row.
Then, the class label corresponding to the closest projection,
y∗, is selected as follows:
y∗ = argminyi∈C D(x, xˆyi) (15)
where D denotes a distance measure to determine the closest
projection. We use the root mean square error (RMSE) as the
distance measure. Therefore, the candidate generated with
label y∗ is the purified sample which goes into Mt:
xpurified = xˆy∗ (16)
Finally, the purified sample is fed into the target classifier Mt
as follows:
yt =Mt(xpurified) (17)
The complete process of generating the purified sample using
PuVAE is illustrated in Figure 3.
4 Experiments
In this section, we determine optimal setting for PuVAE, and
present the defense performance of PuVAE against adversarial
attacks. We used Tensorflow (1.12.0) for the experiments. A
GPU, an NVIDIA TITAN V (12 GB), and a CPU, an Intel
Xeon E5-2690 v4 (2.6 GHz), were used. We used MNIST
[LeCun et al., 1998] which is a hand-written digit dataset,
Fashion-MNIST [Xiao et al., 2017] which is a clothing object
image dataset, and CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009]
which is a tiny natural image dataset. Each dataset consists
of 50,000 training instances and 10,000 test instances. We
normalized data between 0 and 1.
We used FGSM, iFGSM, RAND+FGSM, and CW attacks
for the experiments. FGSM, iFGSM, and RAND+FGSM
were generated with an adversarial perturbation size of 0.3
for the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets, and 0.06 for the
CIFAR-10 dataset. We set the upper limit on the random noise
of RAND+FGSM as 0.05 for the MNIST and the Fashion-
MNIST datasets, and 0.005 for the CIFAR-10 dataset. We
set the number of iterations of the CW attack as 100 on all
datasets. The performance of defense mechanisms is measured
by the accuracy of the target classifier.
Table 2: Defense performance on the MNIST dataset (%).
Classifier Attacks No Attack No Defense Adv. Tr. MagNet Defense-GAN PuVAE
A FGSM (0.3) 99.51 12.46 78.57 26.90 85.29 81.33
iFGSM (0.3) 99.51 0.00 91.72 72.48 87.40 92.33
RAND+FGSM (0.05, 0.3) 99.51 10.64 84.21 32.34 89.02 82.70
CW (100) 99.51 0.43 18.80 18.80 90.04 90.80
B FGSM (0.3) 99.29 28.85 88.49 71.70 86.03 88.25
iFGSM (0.3) 99.29 0.04 93.56 86.29 88.55 92.25
RAND+FGSM (0.05, 0.3) 99.29 6.42 88.44 41.66 89.76 85.03
CW (100) 99.29 0.59 19.20 19.10 90.76 92.92
Table 3: Defense performance on the Fashion-MNIST dataset (%).
Classifier Attacks No Attack No Defense Adv. Tr. MagNet Defense-GAN PuVAE
A FGSM (0.3) 93.46 4.06 11.51 11.71 56.67 59.18
iFGSM (0.3) 93.46 0.00 50.31 34.70 65.11 72.51
RAND+FGSM (0.05, 0.3) 93.46 1.60 8.72 6.96 59.52 45.13
CW (100) 93.46 5.01 18.00 15.50 68.60 80.59
B FGSM (0.3) 93.54 2.75 8.00 15.30 58.20 52.46
iFGSM (0.3) 93.54 0.00 46.97 41.84 66.06 71.04
RAND+FGSM (0.05, 0.3) 93.54 1.34 9.93 7.44 60.98 52.22
CW (100) 93.54 4.87 16.70 16.70 67.62 79.42
Table 4: Defense performance on the CIFAR-10 dataset (%).
Classifier Attacks No Attack No Defense Adv. Tr. MagNet Defense-GAN PuVAE
C FGSM (0.06) 82.13 3.82 19.07 18.58 29.74 33.71
iFGSM (0.06) 82.13 0.32 24.13 27.00 33.69 35.49
RAND+FGSM (0.005, 0.06) 82.13 4.84 21.27 19.99 36.74 33.76
CW (100) 82.13 9.88 56.48 40.13 38.13 36.36
D FGSM (0.06) 80.30 3.19 15.00 18.98 30.11 33.20
iFGSM (0.06) 80.30 0.43 21.51 29.95 32.47 34.48
RAND+FGSM (0.005, 0.06) 80.30 4.13 18.55 20.44 35.76 34.40
CW (100) 80.30 9.92 13.64 15.71 28.10 31.70
The architectures of the encoder and the decoder of PuVAE
are presented in Table 1. Dilated Conv(n, k × k, r) denotes
a dilated convolution layer with n feature maps, filter size
k × k, and dilation rate r. Deconv(n, k × k, s) denotes a
deconvolution layer with n feature maps, filter size k × k,
and stride s. FC(m) denotes a fully connected layer with m
units. ReLU denotes the rectified linear unit. We use the first
half of the last layer of the encoder, 32 output units, as µ and
the second half is passed to the softplus function to infer σ.
We used the architecture of Defense-GAN and the reformer
network of MagNet as suggested in [Samangouei et al., 2018]
and [Meng and Chen, 2017] respectively. The architectures of
Mt and Ms are shown in the Supplementary Materials2.
4.1 Effect of coefficients on Training PuVAE
Figure 4 demonstrates the characteristics of generated samples
based on the combinations of three coefficients λRC, λKL, and
λCE. If λRC is larger than λKL, the constraint of the posterior
2https://anonymous-puvae.github.io/
distribution of the encoder is relieved. Thus, the encoder easily
maps the input samples to the low likelihood area of the latent
space. The characteristic of this mapping causes the decoder
to generate strange image as demonstrated in the first row of
Figure 4.
Conversely, the typical form of each class is generated when
λKL is large in model learning. Therefore, as shown in the last
row of Figure 4, it is possible to generate samples that exhibit
distinctive characteristics of each class even if an input sample
in other classes come in. The red box of Figure 4 illustrate that
the purified sample xpurified is analogous to the input sample x,
with the effect of adversarial noise removed. Additionally, the
highest defense performance is acquired from the coefficient
combination in the last row of Figure 4. Therefore, we set λRC,
λKL and λCE to 0.01, 0.1, and 10, respectively, as coefficients
in experiments.
4.2 Defense Performance
In this section, we compare the defense performance of Pu-
VAE with maximum defense abilities of adversarial training,
Method FGSM iFGSM RAND+FGSM CW
PuVAE
Defense-GAN
Figure 5: Comparison with Defense-GAN in a reasonable time con-
straint.
MagNet, and Defense-GAN. To obtain the best performance
of Defense-GAN, we set the number of iterations as 200 and
the number of candidates as 20. Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the
performances of defense methods on the MNIST, the Fashion-
MNIST, and the CIFAR-10 datasets respectively.
As shown in Table 2, the performance of PuVAE exceeds
that of MagNet on all attacks and is comparable to that of
Defense-GAN. Adversarial training is also comparable with
our method in FGSM, iFGSM, and RAND+FGSM albeit a
very low performance in the CW attack. Since we used gra-
dients from Mt for adversarial training, it is robust against
gradient based attacks (FGSM, iFGSM, and RAND+FGSM),
but weak against the other attack.
As shown in Table 3, PuVAE shows the best performance
against iFGSM and the CW attacks in both architectures. Even
though iFGSM is the most difficult attack when there is no
defense, the proposed model effectively defends the attack.
The purified images on the MNIST and the Fasion-MNIST
datsets are visualized in Supplementary Materials.
As shown in Table 4, the CIFAR-10 dataset shows overall
low accuracy. Although adversarial training exhibits the best
performance at a certain setting, it shows unstable results
depending on models and attacks. However, PuVAE shows the
best performance in various attacks and model architectures.
Our method also exhibits a robust performance in settings
where it does not take the first place. This indicates that the
proposed method shows the general defense ability across
various attacks.
4.3 Performance in a Reasonable Time Constraint
Defense mechanisms including Defense-GAN and PuVAE
purify adversarial examples in a pre-processing manner. In
contrast to PuVAE, Defense-GAN takes a significant amount
of time to derive the maximum performance. While Defense-
GAN takes approximately 14.8 seconds, PuVAE takes 0.114
seconds to purify a mini-batch with 128 MNIST images, al-
lowing nearly 130 times faster inference as shown in Table
5.
Table 5: Inference time comparison of PuVAE and Defense-GAN.
Method PuVAE Defense-GAN
Time (seconds) 0.11 14.80
Ratio 1 134.55
Table 6: Accuracy of defense methods within one second (%).
Method FGSM iFGSM RAND+FGSM CW
Adv. Tr. 78.57 91.72 84.21 18.80
MagNet 26.90 72.48 32.34 18.80
Defense-GAN 69.25 73.85 71.50 72.79
PuVAE 81.33 92.33 82.70 90.80
The security issue of adversarial attacks becomes particu-
larly prominent in autonomous driving because it is not plausi-
ble to apply purifying-models that take a considerable amount
of time to real-time applications. This setback of Defense-
GAN accentuates the need for time-efficient defense methods.
Therefore, we measured the performance based on a reason-
able time limit with the MNIST dataset. In the experiments,
we set the time limit as one second.
In Figure 5, the solid lines show the performances of Pu-
VAE, and the dotted lines show the performances of Defense-
GAN. Each color denotes a different attack method. PuVAE
performs with one inference, and thus the performance of
PuVAE is superior to that of Defense-GAN within the time
limit. Since Defense-GAN creates a hidden vector iteratively
by the gradient-based optimization process, the performance
increases as time lapses. However, its performance does not
reach the performance of PuVAE in the time limit. Therefore,
PuVAE is more efficient than the state-of-the-art method for
real-time applications.
It is unfair to compare PuVAE and Defense-GAN without
time constraint because the inference time of Defense-GAN
significantly exceeds that of PuVAE. We compared the two
defense methods after setting the time limit to one second.
As shown in Table 6, it is observed that the performance
of Defense-GAN is significantly lower than its maximum
performance. Therefore, PuVAE is more practical in real-
world scenarios because it exhibits the highest performance in
a reasonable time condition.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose PuVAE, a novel VAE-based defense
method that effectively purifies adversarial attacks. PuVAE
is robust against various attacks and overcomes the disadvan-
tages of adversarial training. The performance of PuVAE is
also comparable to the best performance of Defense-GAN.
In addition, PuVAE significantly ourperforms Defense-GAN
given a reasonable time limit. We demonstrate the advantages
of the proposed method on various datasets and adversarial
attacks. For future work, we plan to apply our method to
real-time applications such as autonomous-driving, face iden-
tification, and surveillance systems.
References
[Akhtar and Mian, 2018] Naveed Akhtar and Ajmal Mian.
Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer
vision: A survey. IEEE Access, 6:14410–14430, 2018.
[Buckman et al., 2018] Jacob Buckman, Aurko Roy, Colin
Raffel, and Ian Goodfellow. Thermometer encoding: One
hot way to resist adversarial examples. In Submissions
to International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018.
[Car, 2017] Towards evaluating the robustness of neural net-
works. arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.04644, 2017.
[Doersch, 2016] Carl Doersch. Tutorial on variational autoen-
coders. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.05908, 2016.
[Goodfellow et al., 2015] Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens,
and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adver-
sarial examples. In International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2015.
[Guo et al., 2017] Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha
Cisse, and Laurens van der Maaten. Countering adver-
sarial images using input transformations. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.00117, 2017.
[He et al., 2016] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing
Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image recog-
nition. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition, pages 770–778, 2016.
[Hwang et al., 2017] Uiwon Hwang, Sungwoon Choi, and
Sungroh Yoon. Disease prediction from electronic health
records using generative adversarial networks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.04126, 2017.
[Kingma and Welling, 2013] Diederik P Kingma and Max
Welling. Auto-encoding variational bayes. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6114, 2013.
[Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009] Alex Krizhevsky and Geof-
frey Hinton. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny
images. Technical report, Citeseer, 2009.
[Kurakin et al., 2016] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and
Samy Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical world.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[LeCun et al., 1998] Yann LeCun, Le´on Bottou, Yoshua Ben-
gio, Patrick Haffner, et al. Gradient-based learning ap-
plied to document recognition. Proceedings of the IEEE,
86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
[Meng and Chen, 2017] Dongyu Meng and Hao Chen. Mag-
net: a two-pronged defense against adversarial examples.
In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 135–147.
ACM, 2017.
[Papernot et al., 2018] Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri,
Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey
Kurakin, Cihang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko
Roy, Alexander Matyasko, Vahid Behzadan, Karen Ham-
bardzumyan, Zhishuai Zhang, Yi-Lin Juang, Zhi Li, Ryan
Sheatsley, Abhibhav Garg, Jonathan Uesato, Willi Gierke,
Yinpeng Dong, David Berthelot, Paul Hendricks, Jonas
Rauber, and Rujun Long. Technical report on the clever-
hans v2.1.0 adversarial examples library. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1610.00768, 2018.
[Samangouei et al., 2018] Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab,
and Rama Chellappa. Defense-GAN: Protecting classifiers
against adversarial attacks using generative models. In In-
ternational Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[Szegedy et al., 2013] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba,
Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow,
and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[Tra, 2017] Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and de-
fenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
[Xiao et al., 2017] Han Xiao, Kashif Rasul, and Roland Voll-
graf. Fashion-mnist: a novel image dataset for bench-
marking machine learning algorithms. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.07747, 2017.
[Xu et al., 2019] Kaidi Xu, Sijia Liu, Pu Zhao, Pin-Yu Chen,
Huan Zhang, Quanfu Fan, Deniz Erdogmus, Yanzhi Wang,
and Xue Lin. Structured adversarial attack: Towards gen-
eral implementation and better interpretability. In Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations, 2019.
[Yoo et al., 2017] Jaeyoon Yoo, Yongjun Hong, and Sungroh
Yoon. Autonomous uav navigation with domain adaptation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.03742, 2017.
